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| State/territory |
Market share (%) |
Position |
|---|---|---|
| Australia |
29 |
1 |
| New South Wales/ACT |
23 |
1 |
| Victoria |
38 |
1 |
| Northern Territory |
44 |
1 |
| Queensland |
36 |
2 |
| Western Australia |
20 |
2 |
| South Australia |
21 |
2 |
| Tasmania |
36 |
2 |
Source: Medibank Private Annual Report 2004–05, p. 13
Medibank Private’s administrative expenses continue to be below the industry average, with a management expense ratio (management expenses as a percentage of premium income) in 2004–05 of 9.2 per cent, compared with the industry average of 9.8 per cent. As can be seen from Figure 1, over the previous 15 years, Medibank Private’s management expenses as a percentage of premium income have been above the industry average only three times (1993–94, 1999–00 and 2000–01).(64)
Figure 1: Management expense ratio, Medibank Private and industry, 1989–90 to 2004–05
Source: PHIAC, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations, various years
In 2005, Medibank Private’s share of all complaints made to the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman was 28.8 per cent (that is, almost exactly in proportion with the fund’s market share).(65) Of these, 26.5 per cent were complaints about benefits paid and 33.2 per cent were about service.(66)
In 2004–05, Medibank Private recorded $2.8 billion in total revenue (around $2.6 billion of which was in the form of member contributions), with $2.3 billion paid to members as benefits. The ratio of benefits paid compared with contribution income was 88.4 per cent, just above the industry average of 87.8 per cent.(67) In 2006, Medibank Private’s premium has increased by an average of 5.9 per cent across the fund, compared with the industry average of 5.7 per cent.(68) In 2005, the average premium increase for Medibank Private was 7.9 per cent (about the same as the industry average).(69)
As noted, Medibank Private has stabilised its financial position since the loss recorded in 2001–02. Standard and Poor’s suggests that ‘the considerable improvement in operating performance is due to a better product mix, competitive pricing strategy, favourable claim experience, and good investment returns’.(70) It adds that the stronger financial position also benefited from ‘improved cost efficiency through better health care purchasing and business processes’.(71)
In its 2006 assessment of Medibank Private, Standard and Poor’s notes that the fund’s management ‘focuses on developing strategies that deliver long-term profitability and efficiencies’ but that its ‘creditworthiness is constrained by the highly regulated private health insurance industry, with limited growth prospects, and restrictions on selecting and pricing risk’.(72) This concern is consistent with broader concerns about the sustainability of the overall private health insurance sector discussed above.
There have been two main questions in the debates over the possible sale of Medibank Private since the possibility of the sale was raised during the late 1990s and the government announced its intentions to do so in early 2006:
Whenever the sale of Medibank Private has been canvassed, debate has arisen as to the ownership of the organisation. According to some commentators, Medibank Private’s members are the rightful owners of its assets. That seems to have been the view of Fred Millar AO CBE, who served as Chairman of the Health Insurance Commission for 15 years. Millar commented, in his Chairman’s report for 1987-88:
Medibank Private is a non-profit organisation based solely on its contributors’ funds. The Government has no financial interest in Medibank Private’s assets and reserves. They are the property of its contributors.(73)
According to a report in the (Canberra) Sunday Times in 2000, in documents canvassing a sale, the then Minister for Health referred to a risk of a campaign by members, possibly led by former employees, arguing that the assets of the Medibank Private fund belonged to the members.(74) The Minister, according to the report, asserted in a letter to the Finance Minister that ‘this argument has no force’.(75) That opinion was said to have been based on an unpublished opinion of the Commonwealth Solicitor General some years before, on the basis that it would be impossible to work out the respective rights of short and long-term members of Medibank Private on any ‘demutualisation’.(76) On the other hand, the founding Chief Executive of Medibank Private, Ray Williams,(77) has reportedly said that ‘there is not one cent of Government money invested in Medibank Private, thus any attempt to make a profit out of the sale/privatisation of Medibank Private would be an act of theft’.(78)
This section will consider these issues in more detail, but first it may be helpful to make some observations about the nature of the entities involved in what is often referred to collectively as ‘Medibank Private’.
Significant entities that have, at different times, been relevant to the operation of ‘Medibank Private’ are:
These entities are depicted in figure 2. The relevant legislation distinguishes between health funds and the registered organisations that operate them. Part VIA of the National Health Act, for example, provides separate regimes for the winding up of funds themselves and for the winding up of registered organisations. Note in this regard that the Act clearly treats funds as being entities capable of ownership of assets.(79) The Health Insurance Commission (Reform and Separation of Functions) Act 1997 defines ‘Medibank Private fund’ to mean ‘the health benefits fund conducted by the Commission’.(80) Therefore, the Medibank Private fund can and should be, at least in some senses, treated as distinct from the registered organisation that operates it.
The registered organisations operating the fund were first, from October 1976, the Health Insurance Commission,(81) and second, after corporatisation in 1998, Medibank Private Limited. The owner of these registered organisations is undoubtedly the Commonwealth, but the source of controversy that arises when the Government speaks of selling ‘Medibank Private’ relates, in substance, to the ownership of the Medibank Private fund and assets held for its purposes—which we will call ‘associated assets’.
Figure 2: Medibank Private relevant entities
| Commonwealth Government |
||
|---|---|---|
| Owner of shares in Medibank Private Limited from May 1998 |
||
| Health Insurance Commission Statutory body established in 1973 to operate Medibank and empowered in 1976 to enter private insurance market with Medibank Private, initial owner of shares in Medibank Private Limited |
Medibank Private Limited Company limited by shares established in 1998 to become registered organisation to replace HIC as conductor of Medibank Private fund |
|
| Medibank Private fund and associated assets |
||
The question about the ownership of Medibank Private assets is not answered simply by looking at the name entered on legal documents, share or land registries. Such inquiries might reveal the entity that is the ‘legal’ owner of a given asset, but that is not a satisfactory answer to the question of ownership. This is because ownership can be ‘legal, beneficial, joint, several, general or partial’ and ‘the precise meaning of the term may vary from case to case’.(82) Rights of ownership can also be defined, and limited, by law. For our purposes, it is important to note that it is possible for the legal and beneficial ownership of something to be separated. This is the case where one entity holds something on trust for another. In the private health industry, assets of a fund are frequently held by registered organisations because those organisations hold a more readily identifiable legal status—such as company or association—than do the funds themselves, but this does not mean that the registered organisations necessarily hold the legal and beneficial interest in the fund assets, or indeed in the funds themselves. Whilst organisations such as Medibank Private Limited and before it, the Health Insurance Commission, hold or have held the legal interest in Medibank Private fund assets, whether they hold the beneficial interest in those assets, or whether their interest is subject to the rights of others, are separate questions. These questions are the subject of our inquiry.
Determining the beneficial ownership of the fund and its assets is a matter of ascertaining who enjoys the substantial rights pertaining to those assets. The conventional definition of ownership of economic organisations, according to Yale law professor, Henry Hansmann, in The ownership of enterprise,(83) is associated with those who share two formal rights—the right to control the organisation and entitlement to residual earnings (profits or surpluses).(84)
Some of the general categories of ownership structure for economic organisations referred to by Hansmann and others are:
Of particular relevance, for our purposes, is another category referred to by Hansmann—non-profit organisations—organisations effectively without owners.
Because some of the debate surrounding the sale of Medibank Private has centred on whether the organisation is a ‘mutual’ fund, that question will be considered in more detail below. We now turn to the question of Commonwealth ownership of the Medibank Private fund.
The question of formal ownership of the fund does not appear to have been given much attention prior to its establishment. The Fraser government chose to create a government controlled private health insurer simply by legislating to make operating a private health insurance fund a ‘function’ of the Health Insurance Commission. Government owned business enterprises often take the form of statutory bodies or registered companies, the shares of which are beneficially owned by the Commonwealth. Examples include (prior to its privatisation) the Commonwealth Bank, established as a body corporate by the Commonwealth Bank Act 1911. Nevertheless, the method chosen to establish Medibank Private was not unique. Trans Australia Airlines (TAA), for instance, was not established as an entity of itself, but was a ‘function’ of the Australian National Airlines Commission–the latter having the status of a body corporate.(86) Whilst there are parallels between the establishment of Medibank Private and TAA, there are also important differences. Purchasers of air tickets were simply contracting with TAA for air travel, they were not purchasing any form of membership that was associated with certain benefits. The Medibank Private fund, on the other hand, was established as a not-for-profit entity and offered membership to those who paid contributions to it.
As mentioned above, both the Health Insurance Commission and Medibank Private Limited have at one time held assets for the purposes of the Medibank Private fund. Those entities–the Commission and the company–are properly described as government owned. The Commission was a statutory body and the shares in the company are owned, legally and beneficially, by the Commonwealth. In our view, however, the provisons of the relevant legislation have the effect that neither the Commonwealth, nor Medibank Private Limited or its predecessor, the HIC, hold the beneficial interest in the fund or associated assets. It seems difficult to attribute beneficial ownership of an asset to an entity that cannot sell the asset, cannot distribute profits generated by the asset and must give priority to the interests of others (i.e. members) when dealing with surplus earnings of the asset. All those restrictions are effectively imposed upon the Commonwealth and Medibank Private Limited in relation to the fund by the National Health Act, the Health Insurance Commission (Reform and Separation of Functions) Act 1997 and by the fact of Medibank Private’s status as a not-for-profit organisation.
This certainly seems to have been the view taken by the HIC, which has, on more than one occasion, expressed the view that neither it nor the Commonwealth is the beneficial owner of Medibank Private fund assets. For instance, in a submission to the 1992 Joint Committee of Public Accounts’ inquiry into the administrative and financial relationships between Medicare and Medibank Private, the Commission stated:
While HIC is the legal owner of the assets, the benefits of ownership pass to that function of HIC which provided the funds to acquire the asset.(87)
That position did not change, in our view, with the advent of corporatisation. On 1 March 1998 the Medibank Private fund and its assets were transferred to Medibank Private Limited. The transfer of assets was effected pursuant to the Health Insurance Commission (Reform and Separation of Functions) Act and instruments made thereunder. Shares in Medibank Private Limited were initially owned by the Commission, but later transferred to the Commonwealth. The transfer of shares to the Government occurred on 1 May 1998, and was achieved by instrument made by the Minister for Health pursuant to his powers under the Health Insurance Commission (Reform and Separation of Functions) Act. The Minister transferred the legal and beneficial interest in all of the shares in Medibank Private Limited to the Commonwealth.(88) There can be no doubt then, that the Commonwealth owns, both legally and beneficially, the shares in Medibank Private Limited, but it can be said that the effect of this was simply that Medibank Private Limited took the place of the HIC as holder of the legal, but not the beneficial interest, in the fund and associated assets.
This view is consistent with the expressed government intention at the time. The motivation for the change to the corporate structure came about not because of any government intention to substantially alter proprietary rights in the fund, but due to a perception in the industry that Medibank Private had an unfair advantage over its competitors by virtue of its association with the Health Insurance Commission, at a time when the latter was also operating Medicare, and the two organisations shared offices. As the relevant Minister, Tony Abbott, explained on the second reading of the Health Insurance Commission (Reform and Separation of Functions) Bill 1997:
This bill provides for the separation of Medibank Private from the Health Insurance Commission, HIC, and the creation of a new Medibank Private corporation. Through the separation, the government will ensure that Medibank Private cannot be perceived to have any competitive advantage over other private health funds through its association with Medicare or other government program functions of the HIC. It reinforces the government's commitment to the principle of competitive neutrality.(89)
Perhaps most conclusive in this regard though, is that fact that statutory requirements in place before and after corporatisation have the effect that Medibank Private Limited can not distribute profits to its shareholders and, in dealing with the assets of the fund, must give priority to the interests of the contributors.(90) The Commonwealth has, therefore, no entitlement to the residual earnings of the fund, and hence could not, on the definition of ownership outlined above, be described as the beneficial owner of the fund.
Finally, the language used by the board and management of the company since corporatisation can be said to be consistent with the view that the beneficial ownership of the fund and associated assets does not lie with the Commonwealth. Statements such as the following, found in Medibank Private annual reports, tend to reinforce the idea that the fund and associated assets are held for the benefit of the members:
Medibank Private is a not-for-profit Government Business Enterprise, with the sole purpose of providing high quality, excellent value private health insurance to our almost three million members. Medibank Private must earn sufficient returns to be financially sustainable, and build reserves to weather volatile, unforseen circumstances that may adversely impact member claiming. No dividends are paid and all of Medibank Private’s financial resources are directed to member benefits.(91)
As a not-for-profit organisation, every dollar of profit is retained within the fund for the benefit of members.(92)
For the reasons expressed above, it seems clear that Medibank Private Limited, like the Health Insurance Commission before it, is the vehicle used to hold the legal interest in the Medibank Private fund and its assets, but neither the company nor the Commonwealth can be described, on the definition outlined above, as the true owner of the funds and associated assets. From here, we turn to the question of whether the members own the fund and associated assets.
As mentioned above, some have argued that the Medibank Private fund is owned by its members. This implies that it is a ‘mutual’ organisation. Exactly what constitutes a mutual organisation is not easily determined. As has been noted by the New South Wales Supreme Court:
The Corporations Law does not anywhere refer to a mutual company. It makes no provision for the creation of such a company. Nor does it contain a definition of what a ‘mutual’ is, or articulate any principles for the management of the affairs of a mutual company … (93)
The question of what a mutual is has been considered, to some extent, in cases on taxation and in the recognition of a ‘mutuality principle’. The essence of that principle is that, where a number of people associate together for a common purpose and contribute to a fund in which they are all interested, any surplus remaining after the fund has been applied to the common purpose is in essence a return of their own moneys which they have overpaid and is not a profit.(94) More generally, a common attribute associated with a mutual organisation seems to be member or customer ownership. That certainly seems to be the sense in which some have applied the term ‘mutual’ to the Medibank Private debate.(95)
In Faulconbridge v National Mutual General Insurance Association, Justice Upjohn considered that a ‘mutual’ existed in circumstances where contributors enjoyed rights along the lines of those outlined in Hansmann’s ownership test—where the contributors have some control over or voice in the organisation and where they are entitled, ultimately, to share in the profits of the organisation.(96) As the substance of the suggestions made have been that members own the fund, we will equate mutuality with member ownership here, and will consider the issue by reference to the test outlined by Hansmann, as applied to the members of the Medibank Private fund.
The foundation of claims that the Medibank Private fund is a mutual organisation appears to be the fact that comparatively little has been contributed, by the government, to the Medibank Private fund by way of capital. The position regarding government capital injection can be shortly summarised. The Commonwealth Government made a grant of $10 million to the Medibank Private fund at the commencement of the fund.(97) On 4 December 1978 the Government decided to ‘capitalise’ the original grant of $10 million (that is, change it to capital of the Health Insurance Commission).(98) The $10 million was, however, eventually returned to the Commonwealth by Medibank Private apparently due to an administrative oversight in not giving the Government decision of 1978 appropriate legal standing.(99) At the same time as the purported capitalisation of the initial $10 million, the Commonwealth made a further establishment grant of $11 million. In relation to the latter grant, Medibank Private has explained:
A further grant of $11 million was made in 1978 in recognition of the fact that Medibank Private had repaid $13.3 million to the Commonwealth for benefits wrongly paid by Medibank Standard. An amount of $9.4 million, which was owed by other private funds and which arose in a similar fashion, was written off. While other funds were relieved of liability for their debt, Medibank Private effectively repaid $2.3 million of the total amount owed.(100)
In 1978 Medibank Standard was abolished and apportionment and adjustment of assets and liabilities ‘between the Commonwealth (Medibank Standard) and the Commission (Medibank Private)’ occurred.(101) No Commonwealth funding appears to have been provided from then until 2005, when the Commonwealth made an equity injection into Medibank Private Limited of $85 million in return for 85 million $1 shares. The explanation given for the cash injection is:
This year the Board obtained an equity injection of $85 million from our shareholder, the Federal Government, to consolidate a capital structure more consistent with industry practice. Prior to this, Medibank Private had almost 30 per cent of the health insurance market risk, but only 16 per cent of its capital. Upon receiving these funds, the Board agreed to a range of financial and non-financial targets and a rigorous reporting regime, including rate of return on equity.(102)
It is true then, that, since its inception, the Medibank Private fund’s capital needs have been met, in large part, by contributions from members. It should be noted that, when the fund was operated by the HIC, Medibank Private’s financial operations were always kept separate from those of the Commission and its other functions—that is, Medibank Standard then Medicare—so that the government did not subsidise the operation of Medibank Private, its administration was paid for from members’ contributions.
The issue of capital input is, however, not determinative of the question of ownership. In the most common form of business enterprise—the company limited by shares—the investors of capital are also the owners of the company. That is the case, however, not so much because of the capital input in itself, but because the investors of capital in those companies also have both formal control of the company and entitlement to share in its residual earnings (profits). These rights are granted statutorily or as a result of the company’s constitution, or both. But the Medibank Private fund (as opposed to the company) is not, and never has been, a company limited by shares, and in respect of organisations generally ‘ownership need not, and frequently does not, attach to investment of capital’.(103) Financial institutions, for example, can lend funds to an organisation to be used as capital, without acquiring any control over the organisation. Rather than input of capital being the defining factor, as outlined above, ownership of economic organisations is conventionally associated with two rights—the right to control the organisation and entitlement to residual earnings (profits or surpluses).(104)
If the members of the Medibank Private fund can properly be said to be the owners of the fund, the factors determining this will be not whether they have wholly supplied the fund’s capital but rather, whether members have control of the fund, as well as some entitlement to the residual earnings of the fund. It will be argued below that members of the Medibank Private fund do enjoy statutory rights to the benefit of residual fund assets. We note here, however, that there is a difficulty for those that argue that the Medibank Private fund is a mutual organisation, so far as our theoretical framework is concerned, because there is nothing from which a conclusion can be drawn that members have any right to participate in, or exercise control rights over, the Medibank Private fund. On the contrary, those rights have always resided with the HIC and now, Medibank Private Limited and the Commonwealth. That seems to dispose of the argument that the Medibank Private fund can truly be described as a mutual, as it can not be said to be an organisation owned by its members. The result is that members could not, in the event of a sale, claim entitlement to compensation on the basis that they were the owners of the fund. They would not, for instance, have an entitlement to share in any premium or goodwill paid by a purchaser for the organisation. That does not mean, however, that members could not claim compensation for loss of certain statutory rights over the fund and associated assets. See below for a discussion of members’ entitlements in this regard.
The critical characteristic of a not-for-profit firm, for Hansmann, is ‘that it is barred from distributing any profits it earns to persons who exercise control over the firm, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees’.(105) On that definition, much of the Australian private health insurance industry can arguably be said to be made up of member controlled non–profit organisations. MBF for example, an organisation commonly referred to as a mutual, operates through a company limited by guarantee—MBF Australia Limited. The constitution of the company provides for contributors to the fund to be members of the company. Only a relatively small number of the members are entitled, under the constitution of MBF Limited, to vote on resolutions. It might be said though, that members have, ultimately, formal rights of control by virtue of the Corporations Act 2001. Entitlement to share in surplus earnings is present, but only in the same way as are members of Medibank Private–through rights to benefit from surplus assets. The fact that might preserve MBF’s mutual status is that it is conceivable that the members, or at least those of them with voting rights, could resolve to seek to change the nature of the fund to a for-profit status, which could, ultimately, secure them the right to distribute residual earnings in the form of cash payments.
The members of Medibank Private, on the other hand, cannot be said to have any degree of control, and so the fund fits squarely within Hansmann’s definition of a not-for-profit, or more specifically, a government controlled not-for-profit. A peculiar feature of such organisations, according to Hansmann, is that they are essentially, without owners, by reason of no entity sharing the two ownership factors of control and entitlement to residual earnings.(106) For the reasons outlined above, there is no entity that can claim full ownership of the Medibank Private fund, and hence it is properly described as a non-profit organisation.
As the legal and beneficial owner of the shares in the company—Medibank Private Limited– the Commonwealth is free to sell that company. That does not necessarily mean, however, that the Commonwealth will not be liable in the event that the sale adversely affects the rights of members to benefit from the fund and associated assets. While the members cannot be said to be the owners of the fund, they nevertheless enjoy statutory rights in respect of the fund and associated assets. In this respect the view expressed herein differs, to some extent, with the pronouncement by Senator Nick Minchin that:
Medibank Private is a company owned by the Australian Government. It is not a mutual organisation and is not owned by its customers. The premiums paid by Medibank Private’s customers buy health insurance–not a stake in the company.(107)
For the reasons outlined above, we agree that the Medibank Private fund is not a mutual organisation, but Senator Minchin seems to be suggesting also that members of the Medibank Private fund are in no better position than purchasers of insurance from an insurance company. That suggestion is less sound. That is because members of the Medibank Private fund buy more than insurance—they buy membership of the fund, and that entails certain rights. Medibank Private, like other registered health funds, is subject to the provisions of the National Health Act.(108) That Act requires that the rules of a registered fund provide that ‘the whole of the income’ of a registered fund, arising out of the carrying on of its business as such, be credited to the fund, and that only specified amounts—essentially the costs of running the fund and payments to members–be debited to the fund.(109) At the time of the creation of Medibank Private, no allowance was made in the National Health Act for distribution of profits by a registered organisation. Currently, profits can be distributed only by organisations established on a for-profit basis. The National Health Act also requires that:
In making any decision, or taking any action, relating to the application, investment or management of the assets of the health benefits fund conducted by it, a registered organization must give priority to the interests of the contributors to the fund.(110)
The scheme of the legislation quite clearly seems to be that, at least in respect of not-for-profit organisations, members are to be entitled to the benefit, through their memberships, of the fund and associated assets. This view finds further support in provisions relating to the winding up of health funds. The National Health Act has, since 1976, required that funds be wound up only than under that Act. Between 1976 and 1999, the Act required that, unless a court considered that there were special reasons not to, schemes for the winding up of a fund include provision for the transfer of the business of the fund to another registered organisation which would agree to accept members of the wound up fund on terms substantially equivalent to those they previously enjoyed. Since corporatisation, Medibank Private Limited has a provision in its constitution for the transfer of any remaining assets, on winding up of the company, to another not-for-profit fund.
In 1983 section 82ZGA was inserted into the National Health Act. This section provided for the winding up of funds conducted by organisations which had not, by 1 February 1984, applied for registration as a combined ‘health benefits’ organisation (in that year the scheme of the Act changed from one registering separate ‘medical benefits’ and ‘hospital benefits’ organisations to one registering only ‘health benefits’ organisations). An interesting provision appeared in the form of subsection 82ZGA(3), which provided that, where a fund was to be wound up as a result of failure to apply for registration under the new regime, the scheme for the winding up of the fund must make provision:
for the refunding to each person who was a relevant contributor to the fund, in respect of the contributions paid to the fund by him, of an amount equal to so much of the excess as bears to the amount of the excess the same proportion as the sum of the contributions made by the relevant contributor in respect of the relevant period bears to the sum of the contributions made by all relevant contributors in respect of the relevant period.(111)
That provision was repealed in 1992, but it remains, for present purposes, of some interest. It appears to be an indication that, at least for a time, the Commonwealth recognised that, ultimately, the benefit of surplus fund assets was to be enjoyed by the members.
Whilst the fund remains operating, members’ entitlements can be experienced only through incidents of membership such as lower rates and/or extra services. These are valuable rights. In its 2005 annual report Medibank Private Limited reported net assets of $653.3 million. The effect of the current statutory requirements, in our view, is that the members are entitled to share in the benefit that this asset position will bring to the fund (less an adjustment for the government injection of $85 million in 1985).
For reasons we have outlined above, membership of the Medibank Private fund, whilst not amounting to ownership of the fund, nevertheless gives to members a valuable right to the benefit of the fund and associated assets. This means little, however, unless that right is of a nature such that it has constitutional protection from unjust acquisition. The Commonwealth has broad power to acquire property, but that power is limited by the need to provide adequate compensation or ‘just terms’, to adopt the phrase used in section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. As the scope of the power to acquire property is broadly defined, so is the scope of the requirement for just terms. The breadth of the constitutional guarantee has been outlined by the High Court in this way:
It is now well established that the plenary grant of legislative power contained in s. 51(xxxi) [to acquire property on just terms] enjoys the status of a constitutional guarantee of just terms and is to be given the liberal construction appropriate to such a constitutional provision. In the context of that guarantee, the word ‘property’, which has been said to be ‘the most comprehensive term that can be used’, must be construed as extending to every species of valuable right and interest including real and personal property, incorporeal hereditaments and choses in action. In the context of s. 51(xxxi), the word ‘property’ must also be construed as extending to money and the right to receive a payment of money.(112)
There is a considerable body of precedent that considers the extent of the rights compensable under section 51(xxxi). We do not intend to undertake an exhaustive analysis of that question here. For our purposes we merely note that it seems to us arguable that the right of members of Medibank Private to enjoy the benefit of fund surplus earnings could be one that is protected by the section. The Commonwealth would not, however, necessarily ‘acquire’ any such right on sale. Whether it did would depend upon the kind of sale and associated deal offered to members of the fund. As Medibank Private is a not-for-profit entity, the requirement in the Act limiting distributions of its income and profits would have to be specifically abrogated if any proposed sale was on terms that did not continue those conditions, or the organisation’s status would have to be changed to for-profit.
A sale to another not-for-profit or to a mutual fund which undertook to comply with the existing requirements for not-for-profits under the National Health Act would have the result that they had not lost, and accordingly that the Commonwealth had not acquired, the rights associated with their membership status. That is, assuming existing members of the Medibank Private fund were offered continued membership on similar or better terms. Note in this regard that there are relatively few registered private health insurance organisations operating on a ‘for-profit’ basis, and all of those that do are ultimately owned by mutual organisations:(113)
At 30 June 2005, there were 40 registered health benefits organisations (RHBOs); 26 of which were available to the general public (open membership organisations) and 14 were restricted membership organisations.
Five organisations operated on a ‘for-profit’ basis. Organisations operating on a ‘for-profit’ basis may make distributions by way of dividends provided that they maintain sufficient capital to satisfy the requirements of the Solvency and Capital Adequacy Standards. Dividend payments totalling $20 million were provided for or paid during 2004–05. (114)
If, however, the sale was to a for-profit, and the terms of sale had the effect of giving full ownership of the fund and associated assets to the purchaser, then the members might be said to have lost the rights attached to their Medibank Private fund membership and the question of compensation could arise. If the sale was to be by way of public float of shares in Medibank Private, as Senator Minchin has recently revealed as his preference,(115) then the question would depend on whether Medibank Private Limited was to remain subject to the current requirements for the preservation of the fund. Presumably the organisation would, in that circumstance, be converted to a ‘for-profit’ one under the National Health Act. That would mean it would be entitled to distribute surplus profit to shareholders. Whether an entitlement to compensation would arise in these circumstances would depend on whether that right of distribution was prospective or retrospective. That is, whether it related to the existing assets or future profits.
Any sale of Medibank Private will probably be accompanied by amendments to the governing legislation. In the past, whenever there has been a perceived risk that property rights might be acquired, the government has included a ‘safety-net provision’ that provides for persons adversely affected to apply to a court for compensation.(116) Such a provision is likely to be included in any amending legislation associated with the sale. These provisions pre-empt attacks on the legislation that might seek to have it declared invalid by reason of non-compliance with the constitutional requirement for ‘just terms’. On the views we have expressed herein, any action by members in relation to the sale would be likely to be brought pursuant to the compensation provision, rather than, for instance, in an application to prevent the sale from proceeding. Having drawn these conclusions on the legal aspects of the proposed sale, this paper proceeds now to consider broader public policy questions regarding the sale of Medibank Private.
In stating its case for the sale, the government has argued that ‘there is no policy reason for the government to continue to own a health fund’.(117) The government has also suggested that a privatised Medibank Private is likely to be more efficient, enhance competition in the private health insurance sector and, as a result, reduce ‘upward pressure’ on premiums.(118) On the other hand, opponents of the sale have suggested that there are important policy reasons for maintaining the current ownership arrangements for Medibank Private.(119) For example, the Shadow Minister for Health, Julia Gillard, has stated that ‘Labor believes there is a role for a public, not-for-profit health insurer that can deliver quality and competing products, with its contributing members as the company’s main focus’.(120)
The question of whether there are policy reasons for the government to maintain the current Medibank Private ownership structure will form the basis for the discussion in this section of the paper. While there is no general agreement about what might be said to constitute sufficient ‘policy reasons’, we examine this question in relation to categories drawn from the government’s sale objectives for the fund, the above discussion about the state of the private health insurance sector and the current debate about the sale.
The categories used in this paper are as follows:
We conclude that there is no simple answer to the questions posed above. Indeed, we suggest that, at this stage, there is insufficient information available on the sale from which to develop a conclusive response. Any such response would be contingent on answers to a range of questions, including:
As such, the discussion in this section seeks to clarify key aspects of the debate and highlight those areas in which further information is required.
As noted above, the government has stated that one of its sale objectives is ‘to maintain service and quality levels for Medibank Private contributors’.(121) This raises the question of whether the sale is likely to materially affect the interests of members of Medibank Private.
Currently, Medibank Private could be considered to provide a reasonably good level of service and quality to its members. As noted above, complaints about Medibank Private are roughly proportional to its market share, it is slightly better than the industry standard in terms of the proportion of contributions returned to members as benefits, and it tends to raise premiums at around the same rate as the rest of the industry. The question is whether there is any risk that the sale of Medibank Private could make the fund any less focused on the interests of its members.
To some extent, this may depend on the type of organisation Medibank Private becomes following the sale. For example, it could be argued that, if it were to become a for-profit fund, Medibank Private would by definition be less focused on the interests of its members because it would now have to also focus on the interests of shareholders. This is one of the reasons that Medibank Private argued strongly for the maintenance of a predominately not-for-profit industry in its 1996 submission to the Productivity Commission’s inquiry into private health insurance. According to the Medibank Private submission, the interests of members are best served when funds ‘view their members as ‘shareholders’ for whom the delivery of lower prices is a dividend’.(122) As outlined above, a defining feature of not-for-profit funds is the expectation that they return any operating surplus to members in the form of lower premiums and/or higher benefits.
Medibank Private argued in its submission that assuming that insurers are supposed to act in the best interests of members for the payment of healthcare services (given that members are least able to ‘shop around’ when in need of treatment), they would be ‘acting irresponsibly if they were to have as their motive the payment of a return to investors’.(123) Further, they argued that increasing the number of for-profit health funds potentially adds an additional layer of cost to the financing of healthcare:
A situation where a for-profit ‘middleman’ (health insurers) is also involved [in addition to private for-profit healthcare providers] will unnecessarily escalate the premium (price) for private health insurance’.(124)
While competition with other funds might moderate any such increase, in practice many members (particularly older and/or long-term members) are likely to be ‘rusted on’ to a fund such as Medibank Private and hence unlikely to readily change funds despite above-average premium increases.(125)
The small number of for-profit funds in the sector makes it difficult to find adequate comparative information from which to examine claims such as these. Of the five for-profit funds, the only one large enough from which reasonable comparisons can be drawn is BUPA, which has a market share of around 9.9 per cent. As can be seen from the table below, no clear pattern capable of illustrating a difference between the for-profit BUPA, the not-for-profit Medibank Private and the industry average can be discerned in a comparison of each across various criteria indicative of responsiveness to members. While in 2005 BUPA had lower management costs and premiums than Medibank Private and than the industry average, it had less success in retaining members, received a higher proportion of total complaints compared to market share and returned a lower percentage of benefits to members as a percentage of contributions.
Table 2: responsiveness to members, various criteria BUPA, Medibank Private and industry, 2005
| Fund |
Surplus from health insurance |
Management expense ratio |
Member retention |
Market share |
Complaints |
Benefits as % contributions |
Premium increase 2006 |
||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benefits |
Service |
All |
|||||||
| BUPA |
5.8% |
7.7% |
83.7% |
9.9% |
12.8% |
10.7% |
11.7% |
86.5% |
4.9% |
| Medibank Private |
2.4% |
9.2% |
86.8% |
28.7 |
26.5% |
33.2% |
28.8% |
88.4% |
5.9% |
| Industry |
2.7% |
9.5% |
na |
na |
na |
na |
na |
87.8% |
5.7% |
Source: Private Health Insurance Ombudsman, State of the Health Funds Report 2005
As such, there may be some logic to the proposition that a predominately not-for-profit private health insurance sector is more likely to be more responsive to the interests of members. However, there is little available evidence from which to conclude that any one individual fund (such as a privatised Medibank Private) operating as a for-profit fund would necessarily reduce standards of service and quality.
Some opponents of the sale of Medibank Private have suggested that such an action could place at risk the fund’s historical role in promoting broader community interests in addition to the interests of its members.(126) For example, according to Deeble, if the fund is sold:
… there will be bigger pressure on the government to deregulate and let them chase their good risk members and all that sort of thing if Medibank Private is sold, because Medibank Private has always acted like the conscience of the industry, now selling that removes that pressure, that's what it was set up for that's what it's always done. (127)
In other words, Deeble suggests that Medibank Private has, in general, tended to avoid actions that might be in its short term business interests if those actions conflict with broader community obligations.
There is evidence that historically Medibank Private has sought to play the public interest role suggested by Deeble and others. For example, an examination of Medibank Private’s submissions (1996 and 1997) to the Productivity Commission’s private health insurance inquiry reveals that Medibank Private was a strong advocate for regarding private healthcare as essentially complementary (rather than supplementary) to that available from the public sector. As such, according to Medibank Private’s 1996 submission, private health insurance should be:
… subject to regulation which ensures social justice and community need are met. To achieve this, the universality principles applying to the public sector must be mirrored in private funding—private health insurance.(128)
According to the submission, in the private health insurance sector, universality was and should continue to be embodied in the principle of ‘community rating’ (which, as outlined above, is the principle that everyone should pay the same premium for health insurance, regardless of health risk status).
This did not mean that Medibank Private was seeking a heavily-regulated sector. Rather, its submission argued for a regulatory framework in which community rating provided ‘controlled entry’ into a private health insurance market operating according to free market principles.
The key features of Medibank Private’s preferred approach included:
This advocacy on behalf of community rating is significant for two main reasons. First, it was hardly in the immediate business interests of a private health insurer to actively promote community-rating (as opposed to risk-rating). Second, by emphasising social imperatives such as universality and equity, Medibank Private provided a source of informed analysis and advocacy that could challenge the arguments of those who favoured a move from community rating to more risk-based approaches. This suggests that there is some evidence for assertions about Medibank Private’s role in advocating the role of broader social imperatives in the regulation of the private health insurance industry.
One explanation for why Medibank Private has played this role is that for most of its existence, it was operated by the HIC and for much of this time in conjunction with Medibank (and later Medicare). Hence it was run according to the same ethos of universalism and equity as Medibank/Medicare and by the same people (including Deeble, a former Commissioner of HIC). The public sector as opposed to private enterprise focus of the HIC could provide a further explanation.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Medibank Private has continued to play this role since corporatisation. It does appear to continue to (publicly) support the principle of community rating. For example, in a report published in 2003 by Harper and Associates on behalf of Medibank Private, it was argued that government measures to arrest the decline in private health insurance coverage should be supported on the grounds that they could be seen as supporting community rating.(130) However, it is not clear that it is as active in this support as it was in the period prior to corporatisation. For example, there is little evidence in annual reports and other public statements from senior Medibank Private staff that anything other than the immediate corporate goals of the fund and its members are seen as important.
This is not intended as a criticism of Medibank Private. The era in which social imperatives were a key aspect of Medibank Private’s approach may have been left behind since corporatisation. Nevertheless, it might still be argued that the current ownership arrangements mean that the government has some influence with Medibank Private and hence is able to restrain it from acting against the interests of consumers. For example, health policy commentator, Ken Harvey, has suggested that government control has probably tended to restrain Medibank Private from negotiating aggressively with service providers in marginal electorates. The flipside of this, as argued below, is that the insurer may have been restrained from gaining the best price from service providers on behalf of members.(131)
The government’s sale objectives refer to contributing to an efficient and competitive private health insurance industry. Standard and Poor’s has recently argued that any sale of Medibank Private is likely to ‘materially affect the competitive dynamics of the industry’.(132) While Standard and Poor’s did not specify the precise nature of the effect on competitive dynamics, it appears to see the main impetus for change in the possibility that the sale may lead to rationalisation and greater concentration within the industry (depending upon the size of the newly privatised Medibank Private—a larger insurer being more likely to inspire others to seek to gain in size).(133) Again, this suggests the importance of issues such as the type of sale, the buyer and the type of organizational entity formed after the sale.
A common concern raised in commentary on the government’s policy to sell Medibank Private is that privatisation would jeopardise the fund’s role in providing competition to the private health insurance sector.(134) As indicated above, it is widely argued that one of the main objectives behind the creation of Medibank Private was the Fraser government’s desire to create a more competitive private health insurance market. As noted above, Medibank Private almost immediately brought greater price competition to the private health insurance sector. More recently, the Industry Commission’s 1997 report into the private health insurance industry noted that Medibank Private, appears to have ‘played a catalytic role in intensifying competitive pressures in the industry’.(135) While not clear from its report, it appears that, on the basis of the Medibank Private submissions, the competitive pressures identified by the Industry Commission were mainly in the areas of innovation and efficiency.
In terms of innovation, Medibank Private has argued that its development of new products (such as those aimed at producing a lower priced entry point to private health insurance) have been integral to gaining and maintaining its current national market share.(136) More recently, Standard and Poor’s has highlighted the way in which recent product rationalisation by Medibank Private has ‘strengthened product popularity with younger members and increased membership in this segment’.(137)
Other major funds also have a reasonably strong record in terms of administrative efficiency: as can be seen from Table 3 below, in 2004–05 most of the top six funds, measured in terms of market share, were relatively close to the industry average management expenses ratio of 9.5 per cent. Medibank Private’s national coverage, however, is an important point of difference.(138) Other funds have varying degrees of influence in particular states but Medibank Private continues to be the only health fund with a strong presence in each state. As noted earlier, Medibank Private ranks either first or second in terms of market share in every state or territory.
Table 3: management expense ratio, top six health funds and industry, 2004–05
| Fund |
Market share |
Management expenses as % of member contributions |
|---|---|---|
| MP |
28.7% |
9.2% |
| MBF |
16.7% |
10.0% |
| BUPA |
9.9% |
7.7% |
| HCF |
8.8% |
8.7% |
| HBF |
7.9% |
9.3% |
| NIB |
6.2% |
11.8% |
| Industry |
100% |
9.5% |
Source: PHIAC, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations, 2004–05; PHIO, State of the health funds report, 2004–05
This strong national presence means that, to the extent that Medibank Private has helped to set the industry standard for low administration costs, current ownership structures ensure that such competitive pressures are able to be exerted in every private health insurance market in Australia. This could be considered to be an important role given that the private health insurance market continues to be, for the most part state-based, with important differences in the private health insurance markets in different states (for example, differences in the age of the insured, the percentage of the insured population using public or private hospitals and the levels of service provided by particular health funds).(139) As such, the existence of a competitive health fund in each state could be considered as consistent with the ethos of community rating. This is where the type of sale envisaged by the government becomes particularly important. Any form of sale that had the effect of eroding Medibank Private’s national presence could potentially jeopardise the level of competitive pressure in the private health insurance industry in Australia.
The importance of competition at the national level has recently been emphasised by consultants CRA International in a report prepared for health fund MBF. The report has not been made publicly available. According to a media report, however, CRA International argued that the government ‘should consider selling Medibank Private in pieces to state-based health funds in an effort to create more national players’.(140) The objective of this would be to promote ‘more head-to-head competition at a national level’.(141) While it is unclear at this stage how the sale could be structured to achieve this effect it is reasonable to conclude that such an approach could potentially enhance competition in the private health insurance sector.
It is important to note that the private health insurance market in Australia is particularly complex and that the precise effect of changes in ownership among funds is difficult to predict. There are important differences in the private health insurance markets in different states. This could mean that changes that might enhance competition in one state might possibly also have the opposite effect in a different state. The complex nature of the private health insurance market has been highlighted by former Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) Commissioner, Sitesh Bhojani, when he indicated in 2003 that the process of defining the market for private health insurance would be an important aspect of its consideration of any future mergers between health funds (including purchase of Medibank Private by an existing health fund). Mr Bhojani suggested, for example, that ‘where local factors are the determining influence on prices, it is more likely that the market will be seen as narrower than a national one; much more likely to be state based or locally based’ but that ‘there are no clear answers to this’.(142) He further noted that the ACCC:
… would be concerned in respect of merger proposals by any of the top five or six of the health funds, particularly amongst themselves … It would require very close scrutiny. And in some instances, depending on whether the market is state or national, even one of the top five or six merging with one of the smaller funds may require us to have a look at it.(143)
The key, though, he argued would be to properly define the market:
Depending on whether it’s a state or national market will have a significant influence, obviously in terms of whether an arrangement is lessening competition or likely to lessen competition.(144)
The difficulty in precisely defining the contours of the private health insurance market and hence the likely impact of changes of ownership on competition, again highlights the crucial nature of the precise plan of sale for Medibank Private to be used by the government.
Contrary to opponents of the sale of Medibank Private, others, including members of the government, have argued that this measure will provide opportunities for the fund to expand into new business areas, thereby adding to competitive pressures in the private health insurance sector.(145) The implication of this is that the current ownership arrangements limit Medibank Private in its expansion and innovation.
As noted above, Medibank Private has traditionally been particularly aggressive in pursuit of expansion, innovation and in competition with other funds. Nevertheless, while Medibank Private Chief Executive Officer, George Savvides, has recently argued that ‘there are no constraints [associated with the current ownership arrangements] about being a best practice organisation in the health sector today’, he has also argued that privatisation could ‘possibly’ allow the fund to ‘achieve greater goals’.(146)
While Savvides did not provide details of where Medibank Private might expand under private ownership, as noted earlier, Ken Harvey, has suggested that privatisation could allow the fund to operate more aggressively:
It may be that government ownership (and sensitivity) hampers commercial negotiations, particularly high cost hospitals in marginal electorates. It is possible that a privatised Medibank Private could negotiate cost-effective services more aggressively if existing members were educated about what needs to be done and participated in the organisation’s transformation, for example, by being offered shares and greater involvement in return for past loyalty … Finally, a privatised, freer, more innovative Medibank Private might stimulate a wave of demutualisation, amalgamation and increased efficiency of the remaining 42 health funds, many of whom are far too small to achieve economies of scale.(147)
However, as Harvey goes on to argue, a change in the ownership arrangements of Medibank Private will not by itself create significant opportunities for innovation under current regulatory arrangements.(148) As McAuley has argued, ‘the industry is highly regulated (which limits the scope for innovation)’.(149) The extent to which the sale of Medibank Private would increase opportunities for expansion and innovation by the fund is therefore unknown given the absence of specific details from the government or the fund in relation to where such opportunities might arise. Any such opportunities are most likely to arise as a result of some kind of change to industry-wide regulation such as those recently proposed by the government (see discussion above), rather than a change in ownership for a particular fund.
In a previous section of this paper, we highlighted the importance of the capacity for insurers to contain the costs of healthcare as a particular concern of commentators who question the sustainability of the industry in its current form. Further, the government has nominated the viability of the private health insurance industry as one of its sale objectives. Hence cost containment is an important issue for consideration when examining the potential impact of the sale of Medibank Private.
Some commentators have made the point that the size and national presence of Medibank Private (and other large funds) provide it with particular advantages in negotiating on cost and quality with providers of healthcare services through Hospital Purchaser-Provider Agreements (HPPAs). For example, McAuley argues that:
Service providers such as private hospitals and medical specialists themselves have strong market power, and they need to be confronted by strong insurers. (That is the case for a single national insurer, a case which the present Australian Government, after wasting at least $25 billion on subsidies to private insurance, still does not understand.)(150)
Leaving the case for a single national insurer to one side, it could be argued that the government is not unfamiliar with the advantages associated with confronting strong market power in the health system with a strong purchaser of healthcare. For example, the government’s status as a bulk-purchaser of medicines through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) allows it to negotiate strongly with pharmaceutical companies over the price of medicines. Partly as a result, Australia spends less on pharmaceuticals than many other comparable countries.(151)
Medibank Private’s development of a network of preferred hospitals (under the ‘Member’s Choice’ framework) that have agreed to certain cost and quality criteria is an example of its use of strong bargaining power in negotiations with healthcare providers. As part of these negotiations, the fund insisted that hospitals would be required to provide pricing discounts when the number of Medibank Private members they treated rose above certain levels.(152) According to media reports, Medibank Private also sought limits on which treatments it would pay for in intensive care, limits on how long it would pay for patients to be in hospital and for particular treatments, and sought to impose set payments for treatments from which hospitals must meet all costs.(153)
During the negotiation process, Medibank Private was criticised strongly by healthcare providers and their representative bodies on various grounds, including interfering in clinical decision-making and potentially causing hospitals to limit numbers of patients treated or avoiding less profitable treatments.(154) The fund responded that its actions were necessary to reduce the costs of hospital services and through this, pressure on premiums. It argued that ‘seventy per cent of our costs are related to what happens in a hospital, and increases in those costs then inevitably lead to people dropping out of health insurance and blocking up the public health system’.(155)
It could be argued that any model of sale that had the potential to reduce the negotiating strength of Medibank Private (that is, through a reduction in its size or national presence) could be reasonably considered to put at risk the role played by the fund in containing costs by challenging the market power of healthcare providers. Conversely, it might equally be argued that any form of sale that had the effect of increasing the size and/or national presence of Medibank Private, could well enhance the role played by the fund in containing costs by challenging the market power of healthcare providers.
Indeed, McAuley is of the view that the key factor is that there is a fund strong enough to negotiate with healthcare providers, and suggests that whether or not the fund is publicly owned is essentially irrelevant.(156) The question of whether public ownership makes any difference to cost containment is therefore particularly important in the context of this paper. It could be argued that some forms of ownership are better than others at containing costs. For example, the Blue Cross funds (funds that were dominated by healthcare providers) that dominated the private health insurance industry in the 1950s and 1960s were not noted for negotiating strongly with providers over cost.(157) The precise characteristics and intentions of any future buyer of the fund, obviously unknown at this stage, may well be an important factor in determining the impact on the capacity of Medibank Private to contain the costs of healthcare services.
This Research Brief has examined two key issues from the debate about the possible sale of Medibank Private:
In relation to the first question, the conclusion reached is that, while the government clearly ‘owns’ Medibank Private Limited (the managing organisation of the Medibank Private fund) the fund itself is best characterised as a government controlled not-for-profit entity (not strictly owned by either the Commonwealth or the fund members). Members of the fund nevertheless have certain rights to the benefit of the fund and associated assets and these rights need to be considered in any scheme for the sale of Medibank Private.
Medibank Private fund (as opposed to Medibank Private Limited) is best characterised as a government-controlled not-for-profit entity, an essential characteristic of which is that it is not strictly owned by anyone. While members do not own the fund, they enjoy certain rights over the fund and associated assets. If the terms of any sale continue those rights, at least over existing assets, then no issue arises. If, on the other hand, the terms of sale involved the loss of members rights to the benefit of fund assets, then the Commonwealth may be liable to compensate the members.
On the second question, while the sale of Medibank Private will most likely lead to changes for both members of the fund and the broader private health insurance sector, the precise nature of these changes is difficult to determine. For example:
There is little evidence to support assertions that a privatised Medibank Private would be likely to be more efficient, competitive and (potentially) less expensive for consumers. Similarly, there is little evidence that a privatised Medibank Private would be less competitive or less able to contain costs.
This Research Brief has highlighted several key areas for the government and others to consider in their approach to the sale of Medibank Private. In particular, it has highlighted the importance of competition between funds, and the need for funds with sufficient strength to negotiate effectively with service providers and hence control costs. Failure to account for the likely impact of the sale on these factors would leave open the possibility that while the ghost of premium increases might be chased out the front door, there is every possibility that it will return via a side window.
Disclosure: Jerome Davidson is a member of Medibank Private.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Dr Ken Harvey, School of Public Health, Latrobe University; Professor Graeme Hodge, Faculty of Law, Monash University; Mr Ian McAuley, School of Business and Government, University of Canberra; and Parliamentary Library staff who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Research Brief. The authors remain responsible for any errors and omissions.
Hon. Tony Abbot (Minister for Health and Ageing), and Hon. Senator Nick Minchin (Minister for Finance and Administration), Changes to the Private Health Industry and sale of Medibank Private, media release, 26 April 2006, pp. 2-3. This paper does not examine the issue of whether there is an inherent conflict of interest in government regulating a sector in which it is also owns a business. Rather, it focuses on historical, legal and policy issues specifically related to the case of Medibank Private and the private health insurance industry.
Hon. Tony Abbot (Minister for Health and Ageing), and Hon. Senator Nick Minchin (Minister for Finance and Administration), More innovation, greater choice in private health, media release, 26 April 2006, p. 2.
Sale of Medibank Private Limited: Government Sale Objectives, Department of Finance website, at http://www.finance.gov.au/assetsales/Current_Projects/government_sales_objectives.html, accessed 17 July 2006.
T. Abbott and N. Minchin, Changes to the Private Health Industry and sale of Medibank Private, op. cit., p.5.
S. Leeder, ‘We have come to raise Medicare, not to bury it’, Australian Health Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 1998, p. 30.
R. Scotton, ‘Medibank: from conception to delivery and beyond’, Medical Journal of Australia, 173, 3 July 2000, p. 9.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, Australian Studies in Health Service Administration no. 76, School of Health Services Management, University of New South Wales, 1993, p. 5.
ibid., p. 6.
S. Sax, A strife of interests. Politics and policies in Australian health services, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 21.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 7.
S. Sax, A strife of interests. Politics and policies in Australian health services, op. cit., p. 67.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 12.
ibid.
ibid., p. 15.
ibid., p.17.
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Health Insurance: Report of the Commonwealth Committee of Enquiry’, Canberra, March 1969, p. 9.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 27.
R. Scotton and J. Deeble, ‘Compulsory Health Insurance for Australia’, Australian Economic Review, 4th Quarter, 1968, p. 14.
Note that while Medibank also included provision for free treatment in public hospitals, the term is used in this paper to refer to the compulsory insurance scheme only.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 226.
Hon. Malcolm Fraser (Prime Minister), and Hon. Ralph Hunt (Minister for Health), Joint statement by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Health—Medibank (Private Insurance), media release, 8 June 1976, p. 1.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 236.
ibid., pp. 247-9.
ibid., p. 247.
ibid. See also R. Scotton, ‘Health insurance: Medibank and after’, in R. Scotton (ed), Public expenditures and social policy in Australia, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1978-80, p. 183.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., pp. 247–8.
S. Sax, A strife of interests. Politics and policies in Australian health services, op. cit., p. 136.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 249.
S. Sax, A strife of interests. Politics and policies in Australian health services, op. cit, pp. 136–7.
ibid., p. 137.
ibid.
S. Simson, ‘Medibank turnaround’, Australian Financial Review, 9 June 1976.
M. Fraser and R. Hunt, Joint statement by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Health—Medibank (Private Insurance), op. cit., p. 2.
R. Hicks, Rum regulation and riches. The evolution of the Australian health care system, R.T. Kelly, Sydney, 1981, p. 55.
D. Wild, ‘Private beds in Medibank!’, Daily Telegraph, 9 June 1976.
G. Davidson, ‘Medibank to offer wider coverage’, The Canberra Times, 9 June 1976.
W. Beeby, ‘Medibank sets up its own funds’, The Australian, 9 June 1976.
ibid.
Hon. Ralph Hunt, AM, ABC Radio, 9 June 1976.
M. Fraser and R. Hunt, Joint statement by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Health—Medibank (Private Insurance), op. cit., p. 1.
ibid.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 251.
ibid.
S. Sax, A strife of interests. Politics and policies in Australian health services, op. cit., p. 137.
‘Medibank’, Choice, Australian Consumers Association, October 1976: p. 341.
Health Insurance Commission, Annual Report 1982–83, p. 7.
While it is not possible to specify with any precision which of the government’s measures was responsible for the rise in PHI coverage, it is worth noting that the greatest increase came in the months immediately prior to the 1 July 2000 deadline for taking out a PHI policy under the Lifetime Health Cover legislation.
Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC), Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual Report 2001–02, PHIAC, Canberra, 2002, p. 1.
Standard and Poor’s, Australian Health Insurance Report 2006, Standard and Poor’s, Melbourne, 2006, p. 24.
PHIAC, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual Report 2004–05, PHIAC, Canberra, 2005, p. 1.
Standard and Poor’s, Australian Health Insurance Report 2006, op. cit., p. 3.
PHIAC, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual Report 2004–05, op. cit., p. 1
Standard and Poor’s, Australian Health Insurance Report 2006, op. cit., p. 7.
PHIAC, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual Report 2004–05, op. cit., p. 3.
Standard and Poor’s, Australian Health Insurance Report 2006, op. cit., p. 7.
P. Gross, ‘Radical reform of Medicare and private health insurance inevitable, says Gross’, Healthcover, December 2002—January 2003, pp. 40–41; I. McAuley, Stress on public hospitals—why private health insurance has made it worse, Discussion paper for the Australian Consumers’ Association and the Australian Healthcare Association, January 2004, p. 14.; S. Leeder and I. McAuley, ‘Why health insurance is unsustainable’, New Matilda, 1 June 2005, p. 1. See also the discussion in A. Pratt, Public versus private? An overview of the debate on private health insurance and pressure on public hospitals, Parliamentary Library, Research Note, 20 June 2005, no. 54, 2004–05.
See, for example A. Kinna, ‘Private health insurance: the sad history of a system in crisis’, Online Opinion, 26 February 2003, p.3. Ian Harper has described this situation, in which, the ‘sick’ members of PHI funds are increasingly required to fund the ‘healthy’ as inconsistent with the principles of community rating and has used this as a defence for government measures to increase PHI coverage such as the PHI and Lifetime Health Cover. See I. Harper, Preserving choice: a defence of public support for private health care funding in Australia, Harper and Associates (for Medibank Private), 1 January 2003, p. 6.
P. Gross, ‘Radical reform of Medicare and private health insurance inevitable, says Gross’, op. cit., p. 41; I. McAuley, ‘Behind the smokescreen—here comes the nanny corporation to manage our bodies’, New Matilda, 3 May 2006, p. 1; K. Harvey, ‘The sale of Medibank Private’, New Matilda, 1 March 2006, p. 3; Standard and Poor’s, Australian Health Insurance Report 2006, op. cit., p. 9.
T. Abbott and N. Minchin, Changes to the Private Health Industry and sale of Medibank Private, op. cit.; T. Abbott and N. Minchin, More innovation, greater choice in private health, op. cit.
Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA), Discussion paper—Private health insurance: cover innovation and regulatory reform, Private Health Insurance Circular, PHI 34/06, DoHA, 15 June 2006, p. 7.
ibid., p. 11.
I. McAuley, ‘Behind the smokescreen—here comes the nanny corporation to manage our bodies’, op. cit., p. 2.
ibid., p. 24.
Management expenses are the costs of administering the fund and include rent, staff salaries and marketing costs.
Private Health Insurance Ombudsman (PHIO), State of the health funds report 2005—Individual funds summary (Medibank Private), PHIO, 2005, at http://www.phio.org.au/documents/Medibank.pdf, accessed 31 July 2006.
ibid.
ibid.
Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA), Private health insurance—Report on premium increases in the quarter ending 31 March 2006, Canberra, DoHA, 2006. Currently, health funds must notify DoHA of any intention to increase their premiums. There is no formal approval by the Minister for Health of changes to premiums, however, the Minister does have the power to disallow changes to rules (including premiums) by health funds. Under s. 78(8) of the National Health Act 1953, the Minister must present to the Parliament a report of changes in premiums of health funds within 15 sitting days after the end of a quarter. The report for 2006 includes an increase in the Medibank Private premium of 5.9 per cent across the fund.
DoHA, Private health insurance—Report on premium increases in the quarter ending 31 March 2005 , Canberra, DoHA, 2005.
Standard and Poor’s, Australian Health Insurance Report 2006, op. cit., p. 24.
ibid.
ibid.
Health Insurance Commission (HIC), Annual Report 1987–88, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1988, p. 5.
Sunday Times [Canberra], ‘Medibank sale a bad policy and politics’, 2 January 2000.
ibid.
ibid.
Not Ray Williams, the former Chief Executive Officer of HIH Insurance Limited.
Mark Metherell, ‘“Act of theft” if Medibank is sold to boost coffers’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 May 2002, p. 7.
One example can be found in section 82YH(2)(a) of the National Health Act 1953, which refers to ‘the assets of the fund’. See also the instrument for transferring the assets of the HIC to Medibank Private Limited which refers expressly to ‘any other asset of the Medibank Private fund’: Australia Commonwealth Government Gazette No. GN 10, 11 March 1998, p. 740.
Health Insurance Commission (Reform and Separation of Functions) Act 1997, section 4.
Health Insurance Commission, Annual Report 1976–1977, p. 1.
Encyclopeadic Australian Legal Dictionary, Lexisnexis 2006.
H. Hansmann, The ownership of enterprise, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma., 1996.
ibid., p. 11.
J. Cook, S. Deakin and A Hughes, ‘Mutuality and corporate governance: The evolution of UK building societies following deregulation’, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper no. 205, June 2001, p. 4.
Australian National Airlines Act 1945, sections 6 & 19.
Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Report no. 316, June 1992, submission no. 3, p. 5
Australia Commonwealth Government Gazette No GN 19, 13 May 1998 p. 1291
Hon. Tony Abbott, ‘Health Insurance Commission (Reform and Separation of Functions) Bill 1997: Second Reading’, House of Representatives, Debates, 27 June 1997, p. 6619.
National Health Act 1953, sections 68(2)(b)(ii); 73AAC(1)
Medibank Private, Annual report 2004, Melbourne, 2004, p. 4.
ibid., p. 6 (emphasis added).
Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd [2000] NSWSC 82.
Social Credit Savings and Loans Society Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 560, per Gibbs J at 570–71.
See, for example, the statement of Senator Minchin, cited herein, that equates a mutual organisation with members having a stakeholding.
[1952] 1 Lloyd’s List Law Reports 17, cited in Re NRMA Ltd; Re NRMA Insurance Ltd [2000] NSWSC 82.
Health Insurance Commission, Fifth Annual Report 1978–79, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1979, p. 61.
ibid., p. 62
Price Waterhouse Urwick, ‘Cost effective delivery of health insurance to the Australian public’, Appendix 7 to Health Insurance Commission, ‘Submission to the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Public Accounts Inquiry into the relationship between the operations of Medicare and Medibank private’, 24 January 1992, p. 18.
Medibank Private, Submission to Industry Commission, ‘Private Health Insurance Industry Inquiry’, submission no. D242, 30 January 1997, p. 9.
Health Insurance Commission, Sixth Annual Report 1979–80, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1980, p. 4
Medibank Private, Annual report 2005, Melbourne, 2005, p. 5.
H. Hansmann, The ownership of enterprise, op. cit., p. 15.
ibid., p. 11.
ibid., p. 228.
ibid., pp. 17–18.
Senator Nick Minchin (Minister for Finance and Administration), Beazley confused on Medibank Private, Media release, 21 April 2006.
Section 8B of the Health Insurance Commission Act 1973 applied the provisions of the National Health Act 1953 to the Commission as it applies to other registered health benefits organisations.
National Health Act 1953, section 68(2)(b)(ii).
ibid., section 73AAC(1)
ibid., section 82ZGA(3). The term ‘relevant contributor’ was restricted to those who had been members for 6 months or more prior to the making of the application for winding up: 82ZGA(5).
Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v The Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480, p. 509.
Advice provided to the authors by the Private Health Insurance Administration Council, 14 June 2006.
Private Health Industry Association Council, Operations of the Registered Health Benefits Organisations Annual Report 2004–05, op. cit., p. 19.
http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,,20018989-3122,00.html
See, for example, section 46 of the HICSRF Act.
T. Abbott and N. Minchin, More innovation, greater choice in private health, op. cit., p. 1. Those to declare support for the decision to sell Medibank Private include health funds such as MBF and BUPA. See ‘$lb Medibank Private sale triggers healthy interest’, Canberra Times, 27 April 2006; MBF, MBF welcomes government announcement of Medibank Private sale, media release, 26 April 2006.
T. Abbott and N. Minchin, Changes to the Private Health Industry and sale of Medibank Private, op. cit.; T. Abbott and N. Minchin, More innovation, greater choice in private health, op. cit.
Those to have declared opposition to the sale include the Labor Party, the Australian Greens, several unions and academic commentators such as John Deeble. See J. Gillard (Shadow Minister for Health), Medibank Private sale sells out Australians, media release, 26 April 2006; Senator Kerry Nettle, Privatisation of Australian healthcare bad for Australian health, media release, 27 April 2006; Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU), MPL: Union raises concern over Medibank Private sale, media release, CPSU, 26 April 2006; Health Services Union (HSU), New poll confirms opposition to Medibank Private sale, media release, HSU, 19 April 2006; John Deeble, quoted in Sale time for Medibank Private?—Business Sunday, transcript, television broadcast, Nine Network, 23 October 2006.
Julia Gillard (Shadow Minister for Health and Ageing), ‘Appropriation Bill (No.1) 2006–2007; Appropriation Bill (No.2) 2006–2007; Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Bill (No.1) 2006–2007; Appropriation Bill (No. 5) 2005–2006; Appropriation Bill (No.6) 2005–2006: Second Reading’, House, Debates, 30 May 2006, p. 152.
Sale of Medibank Private Limited: Government Sale Objectives, op. cit.
Medibank Private, Submission to Industry Commission, ‘Private Health Insurance Industry Inquiry’, submission no. 168, November 1996, p. 15.
ibid.
ibid.
Thanks to Ken Harvey for suggesting this point.
See, for example, John Deeble, quoted in Sale time for Medibank Private?—Business Sunday, op. cit.; Julia Gillard (Shadow Minister for Health and Ageing), ‘Appropriation Bill (No.1) 2006–2007; Appropriation Bill (No.2) 2006–2007; Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Bill (No.1) 2006–2007; Appropriation Bill (No. 5) 2005–2006; Appropriation Bill (No.6) 2005–2006: Second Reading’, House, Debates, op. cit.
John Deeble, quoted in Sale time for Medibank Private?—Business Sunday, op. cit.
Medibank Private, Submission to Industry Commission, ‘Private Health Insurance Industry Inquiry’, submission no. 168, op. cit., p. 11.
ibid.
I. Harper, Preserving Choice. A Defence of Public Support for Private Health Care Funding in Australia, op. cit., pp. 15–16.
K. Harvey, ‘The sale of Medibank Private’, op. cit., p. 3.
Standard and Poor’s, ‘Credit FAQ: Building on past successes, Australian health insurers sustain financial strength’, Standard and Poor’s, Melbourne, 17 May 2006, p. 1.
ibid., p. 5.
See, for example, J. Odea, ‘Medibank Private: let’s wait and see’, Australian Medicine, 18:7, April 17 2006, p. 6; J. Gillard (Shadow Minister for Health and Aging), Medibank Private sale sells out Australians, op. cit.; John Deeble, quoted in Medibank Private up for sale—the National Interest, transcript, radio broadcast, ABC Radio National, 9 April 2006, p.1; Hon. John Hatzistergos, New South Wales Minister for Health, quoted in Medibank sale details to be decided, ABC New South Wales online, 27 April 2006.
Industry Commission, Private Health Insurance, Report No. 57, Canberra, AGPS, 1997, p. 358.
Industry Commission, Private Health Insurance, Report No. 57, Canberra, AGPS, 1997, p. 32.
Standard and Poor’s, Australian Health Insurance Report 2006, op. cit., p. 24.
Note that use of management expenses as a measure of efficiency is not without its problems. For example, some small funds have very low expenses because they have regional or industry concentration.
S. Bhojani, ‘The sale of Medibank Private: gone but not forgotten’, HealthCover, 13:4, 2003, p. 43.
E. Coleman, ‘A prescription for competition: sell Medibank Private in pieces’, Australian, 2 August 2006.
ibid.
S. Bhojani, ‘The sale of Medibank Private: gone but not forgotten’, op. cit., p. 43.
ibid., p. 44.
ibid.
See, for example, T. Abbott and N. Minchin, Changes to the Private Health Industry and sale of Medibank Private, op. cit.; T. Abbott and N. Minchin, More innovation, greater choice in private health, op. cit.; Senator Guy Barnett, Adjournment: Medibank Private, Senate, Debates, 10 May 2006; p. 133.
George Savvides, Managing Director, Medibank Private, quoted in Sale time for Medibank Private?—Business Sunday, op. cit.
K. Harvey, ‘The sale of Medibank Private’, New Matilda, 1 March 2006, p. 3.
ibid.
I. McAuley, Behind the smokescreen—here comes the nanny corporation to manage our bodies, op. cit., p. 1.
ibid.
A 2001 Productivity Commission study showed that manufacturer prices for Australia’s top 150 pharmaceuticals are at least 162 per cent higher in the US (based on the lower estimate of list prices); at least 48 to 51 per cent higher in the UK, Canada and Sweden; and much closer to the prices received in France, Spain and NZ. Productivity Commission, International Pharmaceutical Price Differences, Research Report, Melbourne, July 2001, p. xiv.
A. Stafford, ‘Medibank pressures hospitals’, Australian Financial Review, 29 August 2005.
ibid.
E. Rubinstein, ‘Unhealthy practices at health funds’, Australian Financial Review, 8 December 2005; A. Stafford, ‘Medibank pressures hospitals’, op. cit.
Bruce Levy, Medibank Private group manager of health services, quoted in A. Stafford, ‘Medibank pressures hospitals’, op. cit.
I. McAuley, Behind the smokescreen—here comes the nanny corporation to manage our bodies, op. cit., p. 1.
R. Scotton and C. MacDonald, The making of Medibank, op. cit., p. 17.
On this point, see P. Gross, ‘Time to try the Kiwi way on health cover’, Australian Financial Review, 29 September 2005; For a broader discussion of medical savings accounts, see L. Buckmaster, Medical Savings Accounts—a possible health reform option for Australia?, Parliamentary Library, Research Note No.26, 23 March 2006.